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ABSTRACT 
Pakistan conducted six thermonuclear tests in response to five Indian nuclear 
tests in 1998. There existed an interplay of various actors at the external and the 
internal level which enabled Pakistan to reach the decision to detonate. This 
thesis examines the motivations and intentions that acted as a driving force for 
Pakistan to make the decision to go nuclear. In order to identify these intentions, 
this thesis applies the national decision making model presented by Graham 
Allison. The arguments presented will demonstrate whether Allison's model 
explains the complexity of Pakistan's decision to go nuclear and which part of the 
model best explains the motivations that led Pakistan to respond India in kind. 
The conclusion of this thesis suggests that Allison's Rational Actor, 
Organizational Process and the Bureaucratic Politics Models have some 
usefulness in explaining Pakistan's decision to conduct nuclear tests in 1998. But 
these models cannot be applied solely to explain the decision-making rather it 
has to be a combination of all the three models to suggest what motivated 
Pakistan to detonate. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Indian nuclear tests in 1998 irreversibly changed South Asia. Pakistan 
responded in kind on 28 May 1998. It is now a part of the world where nuclear 
annihilation shall always be just around the corner. Generations in both Pakistan 
and India will agonize over why and how it all happened. It was a move 
calculated to demonstrate nuclear parity with India in which Pakistan carried out 
five nuclear explosions. 
The immediate international response to India's nuclear tests, led by the 
United States, was to impose sweeping sanctions on India, and to warn Pakistan 
that similar sanctions would be imposed if Pakistan decided to conduct its own 
tests. But despite warnings of severe sanctions and aid cut off threats by the 
International community, Pakistan decided to detonate its nuclear devices. At the 
time of detonation Pakistan realized that the nuclear sanctions and the threat of 
isolation from the international community would prove detrimental to her more 
than it would affect India. Despite this knowledge that Pakistan is a weak 
economic power and the threats to aid cut off would prove disastrous, these 
conditions did not deter Pakistan to detonate. Decades of economic 
mismanagement and mounting debt obligations had made the Pakistani state 
heavily dependent on multilateral lending and grants to meet its budgetary 
needs. The U.S. initiated multilateral sanctions and brought the Pakistani 
economy to the brink of a collapse, threatening an internal and external default. 
Pakistan's decision to detonate gives rise to various questions. Given 
Pakistani knowledge of the economic and diplomatic pain it was willing to accept, 
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it is important to understand why this decision to follow in India's nuclear 
footsteps was taken. In order to answer this question this thesis intends to test 
Graham Allison's models for national decision-making in the case of Pakistan's 
nuclearization and determine what motivated Pakistan to go nuclear and how 
they were able to do so. 
Allison presented three models for national decision-making, which offers 
a useful methodology to answer the question in focus. I will examine the three 
components of Allison's model, which are the Rational Actor model, 
Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics. The Rational Actor Model will 
focus on the states self-interest at that time. The Organizational process model 
will explain how Pakistan acquired the nuclear capability and managed to put the 
nukes to testing. 
The last part of this test will employ the bureaucratic politics model of 
national decision-making. This section will examine the intentions of the 
executive branch of policy making. It will also analyze the civil-military relations in 
Pakistan at the time of nuclear detonation in 1998 so as to make clear as to how 
much role did the military had to play in the decision making process. It is 
important to analyze the role military plays in Pakistan because of its 
overwhelming superiority over the civilian government and its subsequent 
toppling of the democratic regime in 1999. 
After the nuclear testing in South Asia by both India and Pakistan, the 
concerns centered on the possible arms race in the region and efforts to curtail 
nuclear proliferation. This thesis is an attempt to provide answers to the 
2 
questions that were left unveiled in the wake of the nuclear crises as to what 
motivated Pakistan to go nuclear beyond the desire to attain the nuclear 
capability and curb Indian hegemonic designs ,which is the common view taken 
by the Pakistani government. 
This thesis is divided into four parts. The first part provides a literature 
review and discusses in greater detail Graham Allison's national decision making 
models and reviews what other authors have written about Allison's contribution 
to foreign policy decision making. The second part examines the Rational Actor 
Model a~d tests this model in case of Pakistan. The Third part deals in 
Organizational process model to test the means available and the process 
involved in going nuclear. Although organizational process entails the 
technicalities of acquiring the nuclear capability it might serve to justify the 
statements put forth by the Indian government that since Pakistan had the 
nuclear capability, thus they had to put it to test. 
The third part employs the bureaucratic politics model in much greater 
depth, which includes analysis of the civil-military relationship in 1998. The 
conclusion will serve to answer the main thesis question as to why did Pakistan 
go nuclear, and address if Allison's models describe the Pakistani decision 
making process in 1998 to detonate the nuclear devices. 
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CHAPTER I 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis relies heavily on Graham Allison's model of national decision making 
in his book Essence of Decision.1 Allison has explained the Cuban missile crisis 
through three different lenses; the Rational Actor Paradigm, Organizational 
Behavior Paradigm and Governmental Politics Paradigm, each of which is based 
on a different set of assumptions. His first model, the Rational Actor model 
assumes that, 
"The actor is a national government and that the action is chosen as a 
calculated solution to a strategic problem".2 
The Rational Actor model is the model that is traditionally used by the students of 
international relations. According to Allison the Rational Actor model is useful, but 
to fully comprehend all of the decisions that go into a decision by a state one has 
to look at both the Organizational Process model and the Bureaucratic model. 
Rational Actor model conceives of governmental action as a "choice" made by a 
unitary and rational nation or national government. This model treats national 
government as an individual identifying problems and producing solutions and 
alternatives. The virtue of the model comes from its power of explanation 
especially in case it is able to expose the "purpose" of the nation/state. The 
policies are made by the nation as a whole and are used for the maximization of 
strategic goals. It emphasizes that each government is an individual actor with its 
own goals, options and risk capability. Action is used as a response to problems 
1 Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis Little Brown Company, 
1971. 
2 Ibid., 13 
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facing the nation-state and the decisions are made by a cost-benefit form of 
calculus and are used to maximize national interest. 
According to Allison's second model, "Organizational Process": 
"Governments define alternatives and estimate consequences as their 
component organizations process information; governments act as these 
organization enact routines. Governmental behavior can therefore be 
understood, according to a second conceptual model, less deliberate choices 
and more as output of large organizations functioning according to standard 
pattern of behavior''. 3 
In organizational behavior model, the analyst investigates e.g. the 
standard operating procedures (SOP) of government organizations in order to 
understand which policy alternatives are available to political actors and which 
one is chosen and why. So, the organizational behavior paradigm closes the 
gaps of the rational actor paradigm. Organizations look at the policy output and 
are constrained by organizational routines. Thousands of government 
organizations are involved in decision making process and the problems are 
delegated to organizations and the power is diffused. Therefore where 
organizations are concerned the Standard Operating Procedures dictate the 
course of action. 
Finally, for the "governmental politics model" Allison states that 
"The decisions and actions of governments are international political 
resultants: resultants in the sense that what happens is not chosen as a solution 
to a problem but rather results from compromise, conflict and confusion and the 
activity from which decisions emerge is best characterized as bargaining among 
individual members of the government".4 
This model conceives of governmental policy under question not as a 
rational actor choice or organizational output but as a "resultant" of bargaining 
3 Ibid., 67 
4 Ibid., 162 
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along regular circuits among players positioned hierarchically within the 
government. In this model, the political actors and their intentions, positions and 
interests, their relative power, the action channels through which the political 
actors input and exert their influence, decision rules and similar matters stand to 
the fore in analysis. According to Allison the three models are complementary to 
each other. Allison states, 
"For explaining actions where national security interests dominate, shared 
values lead to a consensus on what national security requires, Model 1 is useful. 
For explaining specific characteristics of a governmental action performed by a 
large organization, Model II is the most powerful. Decisions that emerge from 
intra-governmental debate at the highest levels are the stuff of Model 111".5 
According to the bureaucratic politics model policy decisions are not made 
by rational choice nor by a unitary actor, rather are policy decisions determined 
by an activity of give and take between organizational units which can best be 
described as a process of bargaining. Allison explains the bureaucratic politics 
model as individuals in a group who are players bargaining for position and 
power. As a result government interaction can be understood as a bargaining 
game, with the outcomes resulting from competition. Bureaucratic politics sees 
no unitary actors but many actors who focus not on a single issue but a variety of 
issues. Therefore, rather than giving different answers to the same question, 
each of the three models illuminates one corner of the issue and contributes to 
our understanding. By integrating the factors identified under each lens, Allison 
argues, explanations can be significantly strengthened. Many authors have 
reviewed Allison's three models and for the purpose of my research I have 
5 Ibid., 276. 
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reviewed their literature in order to gain a greater understanding of the utility of 
these models. 
Bendor and Hammond have reviewed Allison's models and they provide a 
thorough analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each of his three models. 
The rational actor, labeled Model I, is simple while, governmental politics, Model 
Ill is extremely complex. Bendor and Hammond believe that a good model must 
strike a balance between simplicity and complexity. They propose a typology of 
policymaking that includes three primary dimensions: number of decision 
makers, rationality of decision makers and availability of adequate information 
(complete versus incomplete) for decision-making. Their matrix gives 12 
separate policymaking types as compared to Allison's three models.6 Overall, 
they argue that in a bureaucratic politics model of decision-making, bargaining 
occurs along regularized channels among a multiplicity of players positioned 
hierarchically within the government, and these players bargain for a variety of 
national, organizational and personal goals. Organizational decentralization, 
slack, or discretion, permits players the freedom to negotiate, and it is this 
political process of bargaining and compromise that produces policy outcomes. 
In contrast, Stern and Verbeek regarded the old bureaucratic paradigm to 
be partly rooted in "public choice". According to them, both of Allison's Model 1 
(Rational Actor) and Model Ill (Bureaucratic Politics) can be construed as public 
choice models. One interesting conclusion that has been drawn from this public 
choice approach is that "the bargaining between such multiple rational actors 
6 Bendor Jonathan and Hammond Thomas, "Rethinking Allison's Models", American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 86, No. 2 (June 1992); 301-322. 
'7 
may produce an outcome that represents no actor's individual preference which 
overall suggests that individuals bargain on behalf of, and in the interest of, their 
organizations in order to mobilize their support. Bargainers are consequently less 
concerned with the overall issue than the impact it has on their goals because 
bargaining does not occur in an open space, but within specified and situationally 
determined channels. Above all, personality and less tangible factors that 
determine bargaining performance matter.7 
The most widely criticized model remains model Ill of Bureaucratic 
Politics. Art developed a criticism in his three propositions of "bureaucratic 
politics" which state that the political stance is determined by organizational 
position. A foreign policy decision once analyzed is the result of pulling and 
hauling among political participants and is not intent of one person. He also 
reasserts that implementation of any policy can be affected by organizational 
routine, standard operating procedures and vested interests.8 
Art's criticism comes from the fact that Allison fails to give us any measure 
to what extent "Governmental or Bureaucratic Politics" actually influence 
Presidential choice. Art's first two propositions deal with policy formulation 
however in his third he turns to policy implementation. Therefore, Art asserts that 
"Bureaucratic politics" does not explain the formulation of policy. 
Kozak and Keagle contend that the relationship between politics and 
administration in the early twentieth century was depicted as policy-making being 
7 Stern, Eric and Verbeek, Bertjan, "Towards a Neo-Pluralist Approach to Bureau-Governmental 
Politics", Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 42; Supplement 2 ( Nov.1998); pg:240-246 
8 Art, Robert J., "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique", Policy Sciences, 4 
(1973);467-490 
8 
the realm of the elected officials. The mechanical execution of determined policy 
was the realm of the professional public servant. Following World War II, 
scholars began to develop skepticism about the politics/administration 
relationship. Many scholars and administrators felt that the reality of public 
administration was not well served by a model that separated politics from 
administration. From that line of questioning a model was developed that 
emphasized the political roles and relationships of bureaucracies, agencies and 
departments and those who manage them.9 
The current day expert and student of the bureaucratic politics model, 
Peters provides an interesting approach to the study of bureaucratic government. 
Peters approached the study of bureaucratic politics by asking what is required 
by a group of actors in politics to effectively govern a country. In his study, Peters 
assesses each of the criteria separately to determine the role of bureaucracy in 
governance. The conclusions that Peters draws from his study are applicable 
here. Peters concludes that there is, to some degree, leadership in the policy 
process being provided by the bureaucracy. In modern industrial societies, 
governing parties do not possess the necessary skills for managing a nation. As 
a result they must turn to and rely on the machinery of bureaucracy for the 
missing or weak criteria. Increasingly the overload of government is being 
passed on to become the overload of the bureaucracy. As an outcome 
bureaucracies are faced with many of the same roadblocks in policy 
9 Kozak, D and J. Keagle eds. Bureaucratic Politics and National Security: Theory and Practice; Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1988. 
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development as government. Those include the need to answer to citizens, 
clientele groups, and the survival of the organization. Thus bureaucracy, Peters 
concludes, does supply some government, but unlike political parties, the 
government provided by bureaucracies is non consensual and directed by the 
bureaucracies' relationship with various clientele groups. The bureaucratic 
politics model, whether one is inclined to see it in a positive or negative 
perspective, has both good and bad attributes.10 
One interesting criticism of Bureaucratic Politics comes from Krasner. His 
critique is stronger than other scholars because he maintains that Allison 
inappropriately gives too much influence to actors other than the President 
whereas in fact the President is far stronger than other foreign policy players. His 
argument basically rests in the fact that the whole Bureaucratic Politics paradigm 
shifts the blame from the leader or "the President" to the bureaucratic machinery 
and relieves him of his responsibility. He has analyzed Allison's explanation of 
the Cuban Missile Crises where Allison states that President Kennedy's decision 
came as a result of different bureaucratic channels involved and that such a 
choice would have remained a fore-gone conclusion regardless of whosoever 
had been in place of Kennedy. 
Krasner finds difficulty in accepting this and states that it is not fair to put 
all the blame on the bureaucratic machinery relieving the Presidential office of his 
responsibilities. According to Krasner the office of the President brings along with 
it certain values and cultures which are a part and parcel of any decisions that 
10 Peters, G. The Politics of Bureaucracy_3n1 ed. New York: Longman Inc., 1989. 
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are taken therefore, he refutes Allison's claim of Kennedy's decision during the 
Cuban Missile Crises resulting from a push by the bureaucratic machinery. 11 
In order to put Allison's Model Ill to test, Rhodes conducted a case study 
of U.S Navy. The study focused primarily on the policy area including navy 
budgets, procurement and force mix issues and tested the "pulling and hauling" 
effect of bureaucratic politics as is widely believed to be the case by many 
scholars. His intention was to test whether the outcomes of these policies were 
influenced by the bureaucratic positions or were they simply natural outcomes as 
they should have been in any policy issue. His conclusion was however contrary 
to the literature available on Bureaucratic Politics and he stated that regardless of 
the Bureaucratic Politics, the outcomes were not influenced by interests of 
bureaucracy and was not also affected by bureaucratic power distribution. U.S 
Navy made a very interesting case study because in determining how influential 
bureaucratic politics was, Rhodes attempted to go into greater details of 
budgeting, what kind of carriers Navy needed and allocation of resources for 
performing effective functioning of the overall organization, these issues were 
very important to be looked at to determine the outcomes. In his analysis of naval 
ship building between 1950 and 1990, Rhodes found that the role of the navy's 
"service unions" was insignificant in influencing the ship construction budget of 
the United States Navy. According to him, there was no statistically significant 
difference between the parochial loyalties of the navy's Chief of Naval Operations 
11 Krasner Stephen, "Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland)", Foreign Policy, 7 
(Summer 1972) 12. 
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(CNO) between 1950 and 1990. Rhodes concluded that the importance that is 
given to Bureaucratic Politics in shaping and influencing policies is not what 
should be due. Instead he believes that different "ideas" could result in a policy 
outcome and provide a better explanation than Bureaucratic Politics, which is 
overly rated and generalized.12 
Valenta in his research has applied Allison's bureaucratic politics 
paradigm to explain Soviet management of Czechoslovak crises of 1968. The 
methodology of using the Bureaucratic Politics approach by Valenta reflects 
"division of labor'' which the Soviet Politburo members share in various policy 
areas.13 According to Valenta this division of labor is a result of two conditions: 
"(i) a highly bureaucratic political system and (ii) a collective leadership in 
which no single decision maker possesses either sufficient power or sufficient 
wisdom to decide all important policy matter''. (pg57) 
It is important to understand the Politburo because the determinant of 
Soviet foreign policy does not lie with a unitary actor instead it is a resultant of 
political interaction (pulling and hauling) among senior decision makers. Valenta 
believes that the images of national security are very strongly debated in the 
inner circles of the Soviet decisions making machinery however the approach 
taken in resolving issues might differ. In case of the Czechoslovak crises of 
1968, the stand taken by senior Soviet decision makers differed in the time of the 
crises for some believed that military solution to the crises was the best way to 
end Czech reformism and the foreign policy decision makers believed an 
12 Rhodes E., "Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter" World Politics 47, 1994;1-41 
13 Valenta, Jiri, "The Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia," Political 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 94, 1(spring1979). 
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intervention to be too costly at that time. Valenta concludes that the decision to 
intervene in Czechoslovakia and opting for the military outcome was based on 
"bureaucratic interests and perspectives of senior decision makers, 
manipulated information, East European political instability and pressures, 
intergovernmental games in Czechoslovakia, signals of U.S noninvolvement and 
shaky compromises among elements in politburo" (pg.75) 
Finally his study shows that the Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm 
substantially illuminates many aspects of decision making focusing on the 
dynamics of the role played by the bureaucracies. 
Many scholars have reviewed the Bureaucratic Politics Model from a 
public policy perspective and it is important to look at that aspect as well. Kaarbo 
is one such scholar who conducted a study, which is primarily an investigation of 
the role of junior coalition partners in Israeli and German foreign policy. Through 
an analysis of case studies, Kaarbo has assessed the characteristics of 
parliamentary systems and politics of coalition and the role they play in foreign 
policy. Through a case study approach she selected eight cases to investigate 
the role of junior coalition partners in Israeli and German foreign policy. The 
conclusions she came up with stated that intense coalition conflict existed over 
important foreign policy issues between the competitive political parties sharing 
government power and resources. Her research provides a challenge for foreign 
policy analysts who claim that dominant actors always prevail. Because 
according to Kaarbo, non-dominant actors (in her selected case studies) like the 
13 
junior coalition partners in the cabinet, which are considered as "minorities in the 
cabinet", have influenced foreign policy decision-making.14 
Another interesting study in the realm of public policy explaining the 
structure of Bureaucratic Politics comes from Rourke. In Bureaucracy, Politics, 
and Public Policy, Rourke provides scholars with a conceptual framework for 
analyzing the bureaucratic policy process based on two independent variables, 
expertise and constituency support, plus two intervening variables, leadership 
and organizational vitality. Rourke contends that all organizations, even those 
that perform simple routinized tasks, possess some degree of expertise and 
political prowess. He further states that Bureaucratic expertise is manifest in two 
important ways: firstly through the ability to collect and control information, and 
secondly through the types of professionals that dominate an agency. 
Political support, on the other hand, is most often derived from the clients 
an agency serves or important legislative and executive constituencies (Chap.3). 
While all agencies possess expertise and political support, organizational vitality 
and leadership, the intervening variables differentiate powerful and weak 
agencies. He also states that Agency success is also associated with strong 
leaders who possess the ability to mobilize political support and to capitalize on 
their agency's expertise (Chap. 4). I found that most interestingly, Rourke 
explains bureaucratic behavior in terms of the quest for more money, more 
people, more responsibility, and less accountability. These uses of the concept of 
power lead to the conclusion that it is the end of bureaucratic behavior, that the 
14 Kaarbo, Juliet (1996) "Power and Influence in Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Role of Junior 
Coalition Partners in German and Israeli Foreign Policy", International Studies Quarterly, Vol.40:501-530 
14 
more power an agency can acquire, the more operational and managerial 
freedom it will have.15 
Brower and Abolafia in their ethnographic research study have used four 
key elements from Allison's Model Ill to explain the view of bureaucratic politics 
from those that are at the bottom of the hierarchical structure in bureaucracy. 
These four elements are channels, positions, players, and preferences. In order 
to complete the structure the activities of bureaucratic politics, they have added 
Allison's "rules of the game" to their analysis. According to the authors, the 
politics that takes place in the bureaucracy from middle to top is different from the 
politics that goes on from middle to bottom. This makes bureaucratic politics a 
"bargaining game". One interesting result of their study comes from the fact that 
in lower levels of bureaucracy, the actors do not have the authority to influence 
the policies therefore the elements of "individual identity, self-esteem, and career 
become the stakes for political action". 
The authors in their conclusion state that the actors that are at work from 
below lack the position to influence policies, but this does not mean that they do 
not engage in bureaucratic politics at all. They do and since they are unable to 
use the regular available channels therefore, they use alternative channels to 
participate in politics. I would agree with the authors that from the top, the main 
goal is to bargain for a desired governmental outcome and from below it boils 
down to selfhood and identity. Thus, when we talk about Bureaucratic Politics, it 
15 Rourke, F. E. (1984). Bureaucracy, politics, and public policy (3rd ed.). Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company 
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is important to analyze all those unseen factors that are involved in shaping the 
outcomes of any policy. 16 
From the Public Administration perspective, Paul 'T Hart and Uriel 
Rosenthal in their research "Reappraising Bureaucratic Politics" have dealt with 
three issues concerning the Bureaucratic Politics. Their research is very 
interesting because after reviewing the three issues, they have left the grounds 
open for International Relations scholars to import some of the conclusions and 
utilize it in their researches. According to the authors, IR scholars have not 
included in their research of Bureaucratic Politics any new dimensions than those 
that were provided by Allison in 1971. The three issues deal with topics relating 
with using the Bureaucratic Politics model as a "catch all" theory, four 
perspectives about Bureaucratic Politics and lastly considering Bureaucratic 
Politics to be a good or bad thing. Firstly, the authors find the whole bureaucratic 
politics model to be "superfluous". They believe that Bureaucratic Politics model 
fails to take into account the relationship politicians share with other stakeholders 
in the policy networks. This model remains so much ingrained in the political 
infighting that takes between the political bureaucrats that it loses its focus in 
explaining the relationship between the politicians and bureaucratic advisors that 
also includes military elites.17 
The authors also criticize the previous research that has been done for 
better understanding of Bureaucratic Politics Model. The question that they have 
16 Brower Ralph Sand Abolafia Mitchel Y, "Bureaucratic politics: the view from below", Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol.7 No.2 (April 1997); 305 
17 'T Hart Paul and Rosenthal Uriel, "Reappraising Bureaucratic Politics", Mershon International Studies 
Review. Vol. 42; 2 ( Nov.1998); 233-240 
16 
posed is as to why Bureaucratic Politics is taken as a dependent variable to 
explain the policy outcomes? The authors contend that the bureaucratic division 
of labor that exists between the executive branches is responsible for 
bureaucratic politics and is a resultant of the rivalries between bureaus. 'T Hart 
and Rosenthal have done a great deal of research providing a different 
perspective to the entire debate that surrounds Bureaucratic politics both in 
Public Administration circles and that too in the foreign policy analysis. They 
have stated that the need is to look beyond the obvious bureaucratic politics set 
up and come up with more explanations regarding inter and intra governmental 
politics that forms a bigger part of the whole structure of Bureaucratic Politics. 
After reviewing the existing literature I find it difficult to actually state 
whether various authors have justified their criticism of Allison's models rightly or 
not because each has done so trying to apply Allison in different situations. 
Overall, I conclude that this past research and critique of Allison suggests that no 
one model in its entirety can be used to explain national decision making. The 
Rational Actor Model is as important as the Bureaucratic Politics Model and 
where emphasis is given on different foreign policy participants the role a 
President plays as a unitary actor can also not be ignored therefore these three 
models together best explain any decision taken. From the formulation of a policy 
till its implementation the standard operation procedures of an organization can 
also not be disregarded because the organizational process forms the basis for 
bureaucratic politics thus giving shape and outcome to the governmental 
decisions. The usefulness of Allison's models depends on the situation or crises 
17 
one intends to explain. But overall there have been more criticisms of his models, 
especially the bureaucratic politics model in providing a ground base for 
explaining national decision making. 
METHODOLOGY: 
This thesis is based on a single case study and will test Graham Allison's three 
models for national decision making. I will be testing all the three models 
separately to find out as to which model (if any) best explains as to what were the 
intentions of Pakistan when it went nuclear in 1998. The data that is available to 
me for this thesis is basically drawn from journalistic records and I will be making 
use of these records as the sole sources available to conduct this research. 
I believe that testing the validity of the bureaucratic politics model (Model 
Ill) presents some special problems, especially in a parliamentary system like 
that of Pakistan (especially when we do a case study of Pakistani politics in 
1998). Cabinet solidarity and secrecy will make it difficult for me to empirically 
measure the level of debate and compromise that took place within the inner 
circle of government. The condition of non-partisanship adhered to by 
bureaucrats made any public record from a senior bureaucrat suspect to 
questions of neutrality or ruling party doctrine. Finally, the debate that occurred at 
the intra-departmental level occurred behind closed doors during the course of 
the working day and was not susceptible to public debate and scrutiny. This 
presents a methodological challenge to this study. However, with a 
comprehensive review of journalistic materials available, many of the problems 
will be overcome. 
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CHAPTER II 
MODEL I: RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL 
I will provide additional elaboration of Allison's Rational Actor Model before 
applying it in case of Pakistan. Following are the basic concepts that make up 
RAM 
"(i) Goals and Objectives 
(ii) Alternatives 
(iii) Consequences and 
(iv) Choice". 18 
According to Allison, in any foreign policy decision or national decision 
making, an agent at the outset of his decision ranks all possible sets of 
consequences according to his goals and objectives, and then he chooses from 
a possible set of alternatives in the light of those objectives. Every alternative 
bears different sets of consequences and different assumptions are derived from 
each alternative. Lastly, Allison suggests that a "rational choice" is made by the 
decision maker when he selects the best possible alternative as his course of 
action which maximizes the gains of his decision and minimizes the costs. 
The basic unit of analysis in Rational Actor paradigm is governmental 
action as a "rational choice." Allison states that the rational actor selects the 
action that will maximize strategic goals and objectives. Allison has based his 
Model I on a number of assumptions in which action is a form of behavior that 
reflects intention or purpose. The assumption is that actor is a national 
government and the act chosen is a calculated solution to a strategic problem. All 
these assumptions lead to a coherent set of details which explain as to what goal 
18 Allison; pp.29-30 
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was perceived by the government when it acted and how that action was a 
reasonable choice keeping in mind the nation's objectives. 
He states that 
"The rational action maintains that a rational choice consists of value-
maximizing adaptation within the context of a given payoff function, fixed 
alternatives and consequences that are known."19 
According to Allison, the actor (government) is a rational, unitary decision 
maker. The actor has one set of specified goals, one set of perceived options, 
and a single estimate of the consequences that follow from each alternative. 
Allison identifies the problem as action chosen in response to a specific problem. 
The action is a steady state choice as perceived by Allison, among alternatives 
rather than a large number of partial choices in a dynamic stream of events. The 
Rational Actor model therefore has a unitary (or group) decision maker who is 
able to state objectives, state preferences among objectives, generate alternative 
courses of action, assess the consequences of every alternative action of each 
objective and select the best alternative. Unlike the two other models (which are 
merely descriptive) this model is normative, that is decision makers should make 
decisions in accordance with these principles.20 I will now apply this model to the 
case of Pakistan's detonation in 1998. 
In understanding how RAM can be applied to the case of Pakistan's 
detonation, I will follow the four basic principles as proposed by Allison that lead 
towards a rational choice. 
19Ibid.,31 
20 Ibid.,33 
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(i) Goals and Objectives: 
Like all strategic goals are achieved in the light of goals and objectives of 
the decision maker therefore, the most primary objective for Pakistan after Indian 
nuclear tests was to safeguard her national security. Pakistan's national security 
was threatened when India conducted the tests in Pokhran, because it signaled a 
dramatic shift in India's nuclear posture. India repeatedly emphasized that the 
tests were not directed at any country but were meant to provide a credible 
option to counter the geo-strategic threats in the region. The Indian foreign office 
also released statements that sought to explain the Indian point of view to China 
and to plead for friendly cooperation moreover these tests conducted by India 
were said to be Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE).21 But given the hostility 
between the two nations; Pakistan disregarded Indian statements of a peaceful 
nuclear program and centered their arguments on a grand hegemonic design 
that India had all along for South Asia which was realized by her nuclear testing. 
Therefore, whatever decision Pakistan was to take was to revolve around her 
strategic goals and objectives which ultimately go no further than India being a 
threatening neighbor. 
(ii) Alternatives 
Analyzing the options available to Pakistan is the next step in applying the 
Rational Actor Model. Pakistan had been under pressure from across the political 
spectrum to explode a nuclear device of its own since India carried out its five 
21 http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june98/india 5-12.html 
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tests on May 11 and May 13. Therefore there were only three options available to 
Pakistan 
(a) Do nothing 
(b) Turn to international community and condemn the testing or 
(c) Respond in kind to maintain the nuclear balance of power in the region 
without which the most affected state would have been Pakistan. 
Any wrong choice at that time would have resulted in a chaos and lifetime 
regret, therefore it was ultimate for Pakistan's survival to make the right choice. 
The choice of doing nothing bore consequences and so did the rest of the two 
options available. But besides these three alternatives there was no fourth 
means available of avoiding this whole ordeal when national security was 
threatened. Especially when one considers the whole time frame which does not 
span more than 20 days from the time India detonated and Pakistan responded, 
it is interesting to note whether there could have been more options available or 
not. As short as the time was for any of Pakistan's action to be credible, it leaves 
little choice for analysis that the whole decision was based on very limited 
options available to Pakistan. 
(iii) Consequences 
All the above mentioned three options bear different consequences with 
merits and demerits. I will elaborate these options in greater detail, presenting a 
cost-benefit analysis in each given case. 
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-First Choice: Do Nothing: 
The first option always in any given case is to do nothing, so this was true 
for Pakistan as well. After India had carried out successful nuclear tests, the 
choice left for Pakistan was simply to accept it and also accept the nuclear status 
it brought to India. Like any other situation this option had its pros and cons as 
well. Had Pakistan chosen this option, the world would have regarded Pakistan 
as a stable nation who despite being grossly vulnerable to an Indian action like 
detonation, kept its cool and refrained from following in India's footsteps. And as 
two wrongs do not make one right, Pakistan's response would have made the 
things worse. This option had two flaws. 
Firstly, if Pakistan had decided on doing nothing, it would have reiterated 
Indian suspicions that Pakistan is a weak state, fearful of Indian hegemony in 
South Asia and that Pakistan does not bear a capability to respond which gives 
India a free hand to do whatever she might please to disturb the strategic 
balance of power in the region. 
Secondly, if Pakistan had decided not to respond at that time then there 
was nothing Pakistan could have done later to have countered the threats and 
insecurity that would have become multifold after Indian nuclear tests and 
Pakistan would have lost her credibility for good. The threat posed by the Indian 
tests was very grave to national security of Pakistan. The Indians detonated five 
nuclear bombs and these bombs developed, gave them the ability to develop 
various kinds of weapons, ranging from a hydrogen bomb, which is a 
thermonuclear or a fusion bomb, to a missile warhead, nuclear missile warhead, 
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and artillery, nuclear artillery shells that can be used in a tactical situation. So this 
is a wide range of weaponry that the Indians were moving to acquire and put in 
their arsenal.22 They already had tremendous conventional weapons superiority 
over Pakistan. This was a blow to the stability in South Asia, and this was a fatal 
blow to the international non-proliferation regime. So all these considered, 
Pakistan was dealing with a country that in terms of nuclear proliferation was a 
rogue state. Pakistan had to deal with India with strength. Therefore, it would 
have been suicidal for Pakistan to do nothing. This option falls short for its merits 
which only bring respect to Pakistan in the eyes of the world, but fail to provide 
any security assurance in the wake of any future confrontation with nuclear India 
after which Pakistan would only have the option to annihilate and perhaps not 
even that. This led to consideration for the second option. 
-Second Option: Turn to International Community: 
Availing this option also had its merits and demerits. The International 
community very strongly condemned India for conducting her nuclear tests and 
at the same time urged Pakistan to refrain from testing her nuclear capability. 
The Indian tests drew immediate condemnation from the Clinton administration, 
who said the United States was "deeply disappointed" and was reviewing trade 
and financial sanctions against India under American non-proliferation laws. The 
other Western nations, including Britain, which voiced its "dismay"; Germany, 
which called the tests "a slap in the face" for 149 countries that have signed the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; and Kofi Annan, the U.N. Secretary-General, 
22 Tellis Ashley J, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal. 
New Delhi, OUP, 2001. 
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who issued a statement expressing his "deep regret." All condemned India and 
urged Pakistan to exercise self-restraint at all possible costs.23 This stopped 
Pakistan from appealing before the International community because regardless 
of the condemnation of the tests by International community the situation could 
not have been reversed. India's nuclear status was there to stay and be a source 
of insecurity for Pakistan for all times to come and the international community 
could not have provided Pakistan with any solace from the fact that the "power'' 
India attained with going nuclear was proving destabilizing for Pakistan. There 
were no merits in sight in choosing this option because India had been defiant of 
the United Nations resolutions in the past where the Kashmir dispute was 
concerned and this for Pakistan was a very major blow. Thus, keeping the 
inefficiency of UN in mind and its failure to curb the tensions between Pakistan 
and India, Pakistan felt useless turning to International community for help. 
Besides the United Nations, the United States had also deplored India's nuclear 
testing and knew that a response in kind would blow the disarmament policies 
the US maintains world wide. This was a very confusing time for Pakistan 
because turning to the international community would mean that Pakistan was 
open for any peaceful arrangements the community would have offered in lure 
for Pakistan not testing her nukes. This would have bound Pakistan to go only 
one way and would not have left any other possibilities open later on if the 
situation for Pakistan was to become precarious. Had the international 
23 Burns John F., "India Carries Out Nuclear Tests in Defiance of International Treaty," New York Times, 
May 12, 1998;pg.l 
http://guery.nytimes.com/ gs ti abstract. html ?res=F20716F93D540C7 l 8DDDAC0894D0494D8 l 
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community including the United Nations, been effective enough to urge India to 
disarm, then this option would have hold its grounds, but at that time it did not 
seem attractive enough to stop Pakistan from considering the third option. 
-Third Option: Respond in Kind: 
The third option available to Pakistan was to respond in kind to Indian 
nuclear tests. Going nuclear and following Indian footsteps was however a much 
more attractive way for Pakistan because this would deny India the unilateral 
technical advantage it might have gained from conducting tests; secondly, this 
option would have restored a sense of a balance-of-power with India in her own 
eyes, India's, the rest of the world's and as stated earlier for maintaining her own 
national security which was threatened in the wake of Indian tests. Finally it 
would provide a chance for Pakistan to test her own nuclear capability and show 
the world that through nuclear power it could match India. 
The demerits of this option were however much more disastrous than the 
merits. If Pakistan decided to go nuclear then it was to face International military, 
nuclear and economic sanctions with immediate effect. These sanctions, if 
imposed in the wake of any nuclear detonation, would potentially destroy 
Pakistan's economy which was already in shambles and under billion dollar 
debts owed to International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Availing 
this option also meant that no further loans were to be given to Pakistan to 
continue with developmental projects and economic stability thus crippling the 
economy once and for all. Pakistan knew fully well that the sanctions would hurt 
Pakistan more than India. The international community already very strongly 
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urged Pakistan not to detonate and had been reaffirming the after effects to 
Pakistan since the time India detonated. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe 
Talbott and General Anthony Zinni visited Pakistan after the Indian nuclear tests 
and personally warned Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif about the consequences 
that would follow if Pakistan considered responding in kind. The list of 
possibilities offered to Pakistan was very attractive as it held the promise of 
waiver from the Pressler Amendment, delivery of F-16's for which Pakistan had 
already paid and a possibility of debt waivers.24 But this would all remain a dream 
and much more restrictions would be inflicted if Pakistan decides not to listen. 
Considering the merits of not going nuclear and showing self-restraint as a 
responsible country was much more lucrative with offers for economic prosperity 
than going nuclear and losing it all. Not only losing it all, but also plunging into 
deeper economic crises with increased debt burden. Therefore, the list of 
demerits for this option was much more lethal in economic terms and less 
attractive than the merit which only would have been coming at power with India 
in nuclear capability and satisfying ego as far as matching head to head with 
India was concerned. There also was a lot of internal pressure on Pakistan to 
respond to Indian nuclear tests. These internal pressures were stronger than the 
external ones and thus outbalanced all international restraint suggestions. 
(iv) Choice 
After weighing these three options it was amazing that the pressure for 
testing still spanned the political spectrum from liberals like opposition leader 
24 Zarah Farah, "Will Pakistan Test? The view from Islamabad", Global Beat, Issue Brief No.35. May 19, 
1998 
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Benazir Bhutto to the religious right. Bhutto reportedly went so far as to declare 
that "if there is military capability to eliminate India's nuclear capacity, it should be 
used."25 Out of the three alternatives lined up, Pakistan chose the third option, to 
detonate as a choice to deal with the crises. The most interesting fact remains 
that this third option available to Pakistan was the one with the most detrimental 
effects for Pakistan's future therefore it remains the most unpredictable choice 
keeping in mind the aspect of rationality. According to the rational actor paradigm 
following is the general principal of a "value-maximizing" behavior as stated by 
Allison 
"the likelihood of any particular action results from a combination of the 
nation's (i) relevant values and objectives (ii) perceived alternative course of 
action (iii) estimates of various sets of consequences and (iv) net valuation of 
each set of consequences."26 
All these four principles must be followed if a unitary decision maker has 
to make a rational choice. A choice according to Allison would be rational only if 
all the alternatives are perceived and options carefully weighed with carefully 
analyzed consequences for each set of action opted. If this is applied in all 
sincerity of the logic that surrounds this statement then it is very difficult to say 
that Pakistan's choice was rational by any means. 
Rational Actor Model and Pakistan's Detonation: 
In applying Allison's Rational Actor Model, the cost benefit analysis would 
become clearer if the Indian response to Pakistan weighing its options is also 
taken into consideration. Since India has remained central to any decision 
25 Benazir Bhutto, Daily Jang Newspaper, May 13, 1998;pg.l 
26 Allison;pg.34 
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making in Pakistan since its inception in 194 7, therefore it is not wise to rule out 
that Indian reaction was not considered while analyzing the choices and their 
consequences. Although, there exists no official reference to support that 
possible Indian reactions were analyzed in each case. Indian Reaction to 
a) Do Nothing: If Pakistan decided to do nothing in the wake of Indian 
testing; it would have strengthened Indian position where ultimate military 
superiority in the region is concerned. It would have been in Indian 
interests if Pakistan had chosen this option because in choosing to do 
nothing, Pakistan was to lose its credibility that it possessed nuclear 
capability and secondly, keeping in mind the animosity between these two 
countries, India would also have had a psychological superiority over 
Pakistan. Pakistan might have lived with Indian nuclear superiority, but I 
believe the psychological victory would have been unbearable. This is also 
suggested by the overwhelming public pressure the Pakistani government 
was subjected to after the Indian tests. 27 Therefore, I believe that this 
option was not the most suitable one for Pakistan because it clearly gave 
India the winning edge which was unacceptable. 
b) Turn to international community: Turning to the international community 
would have provoked a severe Indian reaction because all along India had 
been claiming that the United States possessed a "soft spot" for Pakistan. 
India also had been blaming China for providing clandestine help to 
Pakistan for nurturing its nuclear program. Choosing this option would 
27 http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june98/nuclear 5-29.html 
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definitely have provided Pakistan with economic benefits but an 
unpredictable Indian reaction. Choosing this option would have created an 
Indian uproar of "favoring" Pakistan which might have destabilized the 
situation or help India in furthering its already aggressive stance towards 
Pakistan. 
c) Respond in kind: The last option of responding in kind had the proclivity 
of propagating a negative Indian reaction as well. If Pakistan chose to 
reply by her own nuclear testing then India would have taken a stance of 
aggravating the arms race in the region. Secondly, in the wake of such an 
action, India would consider building up her nuclear machinery which was 
not so much a threat as was of her deploying those missiles facing 
towards Pakistan. But the benefit of such an action would have given 
Pakistan a minimal deterrence against any Indian aggressive posture. 
All the three options with the exception of "doing nothing" possessed negative 
connotations if considered from an Indian point of view. But "doing nothing" as a 
reaction to Indian nuclear tests bore huge psychological costs for Pakistan which 
outweighed the benefits (economic only). 
Rapid Pakistani Response: 
The time frame within which Pakistan responded to Indian attacks is not 
more than 20 days. It is interesting to note that in those 20 days, all the options 
were analyzed (perhaps), delivery vehicles were mobilized (definitely) and the 
test site was prepared (absolutely). The question as to why Pakistan responded 
so rapidly (with the third option of responding in kind) is a very significant one at 
30 
l 
this stage because it refutes the claim of the Rational Actor Model which states 
that the action chosen is a rational action which maximizes the benefits and 
reduces the costs for the actor. The reason Pakistan responded so quickly is 
because that Pakistani intelligence sources suspected India for having planned 
an attack on her nuclear installations. This intelligence report was the basis on 
which the Indian High Commissioner (stationed in Pakistan) was summoned by 
the Foreign Minister and was asked for an explanation at 1 :00 a.m on May 27, 
1998. These claims however were rejected by the Indian High Commissioner.28 
The next day, as the world witnessed, Pakistan detonated five nuclear devices. 
This could only mean one of the two things. Either Pakistan was trying to have an 
excuse in the name of "the so called intelligence reports" that helped expedite the 
testing or Pakistan was building a face saving situation for the world to know that 
due to heightened insecurity (and in the name of protecting her national interests) 
the nuclear testing was inevitable. 
Costs and benefits of pursuing a Nuclear Policy: 
The political victory of BJP in March 1998 clearly signaled a nuclear 
moratorium for pursuing of nuclear policy. A number of times during the political 
campaigns and even after forming the government, BJP maintained that a 
nuclear India was necessary to counter the threats posed by her aggressive 
neighbors including Pakistan as well as China. 29 As mentioned several times by 
the Pakistani officials, that the real threat for Pakistan emanated from Indian 
hegemonic ambitions in the region and pushed Pakistan into pursuing a nuclear 
28 http://www.rediff.com/news/ 1998/may/28bomb3 .htm 
29 http://www.indianembassy.org/pic/nuclear/briefonnucleartests.htm 
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policy.30 Therefore, regardless of provocation by the Indian tests of 1998, 
Pakistan's nuclear tests were inevitable. Reason being India's possession of 
nuclear capability as was demonstrated in 197 4. Pakistan's testing of nuclear 
bombs gave her military a gauging stability against the huge Indian conventional 
capability. Although, Pakistan's testing provided Pakistan only with a minimal 
deterrence but it did stabilize the balance of power in the region. 
Nuclear detonation by Pakistan though shattered all economic stabilization 
hopes but provided Pakistan with a strong military edge in comparison with India, 
which Pakistan weighed as more important at that time than any economic 
benefits in the wake of not testing and responding in kind. Therefore, pursuing a 
nuclear policy definitely was in Pakistan's favor rather than pursuing her 
economic agenda keeping in mind the delicacy of situation that existed between 
India and Pakistan in 1998. Not responding in kind would have involved Pakistan 
in an arms race, which would have borne huge economic costs in the long run. 
Thus, I believe that Pakistan's option to go nuclear helped control the arms race 
in the region which would have proven destabilizing in the absence of such a 
response. 
Following is the scenario when applied in case of Pakistan: 
1 . Basic Unit of Analysis: Governmental action as a choice: Pakistan 
selected an action that maximized her strategic goals and objectives. 
2. Organizing Concepts: 
30 http://www.fas.org/news/pakistan/l 998/05/98053 l-app.htm 
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(a) National Actor: Pakistani nation, Pakistani government conceived 
as a rational unitary decision maker is the agent. 
(b) The Problem: The threats that appeared after the Indian nuclear 
testing drove the actor (Pakistan) to act in the manner it did. 
(c) Static Selection: Among various alternatives available to Pakistan, 
the action taken to detonate was conceived as the solution. 
(d) Action as a rational choice: Now according to Allison there are four 
components that constitute a rational choice: 
(i) Goals and Objectives: Pakistan decided to detonate keeping 
in mind the national security and national interests as her 
primary goal and objective. 
(ii) Options: After carefully weighing all the options available, 
Pakistan chose the best suitable one. 
(iii) Consequences: Pakistan was very well aware of the 
consequences that would follow if the decision to detonate 
was taken and acted keeping in mind the costs and benefits 
of those consequences. 
(iv) Choice: According to Allison, rational choice is value-
maximizing. Pakistan's decision to test its nuclear bombs 
was the most suitable choice whose consequences ranked 
highest in terms of her goals and objectives. 
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3. Dominant Inference Pattern: If Pakistan chose to detonate then according 
to inference pattern, it must have ends towards which this action must 
have constituted a maximizing means. 
4. General Propositions: According to Allison a rational action is the one 
which is less consequential and possesses great value but in this case Allison's 
predictions fall short. 
Allison's RAM provides us with two propositions. 
(i) "An increase in the costs of an alternative reduces the likelihood 
of that action being chosen. 
(ii) A decrease in the costs of an alternative increases the likelihood 
of that action being chosen."31 
If we keep these two propositions in mind then applying RAM to the case 
of Pakistan's detonation will have serious problems in explanation. The first 
proposition suggests that in a cost benefit analysis, if the costs raise high for an 
option then that action will not be chosen thus will not become a rational choice. 
In case of Pakistan however, it was just the opposite. The option to respond in 
kind had huge consequences for Pakistan and according to RAM it should not 
have been chosen as an action rather an alternative would have been preferable. 
But, Pakistan's decision to detonate and choosing this as the ultimate choice 
defies Allison's first proposition. 
Secondly, if we apply the second proposition then the choice for Pakistan 
should have been either to do nothing or turn to the international community 
because their merits put together provide a decrease in cost and either way 
31 Ibid.,34 
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would have proved to be less detrimental than the action actually chosen. If 
Pakistan had chosen the first option of doing nothing as a response, it would 
have gained her respect as a stable nation in the eyes of the International 
community and gained her their support in the wake of any crises with India. 
Similarly, turning to the International community would have helped in attaining 
deterrence of some sort either in the form of International defense agreements to 
strengthen Pakistan's conventional capabilities or the sanctions on India would 
have provided some solace to Pakistan. But instead of all these merits that could 
have decreased the "costs" of action Allison proposes, Pakistan decided to 
choose an option which had the most severe consequences and the most 
"costly" action ever for futures to come. Therefore, rational actor was Pakistan 
but the action being the decision to detonate, was not rational which goes against 
to the Rational Actor Model's principles. 
Conclusion: 
Going back to the basics of Rational Actor Model that dominate this 
paradigm, Pakistan had an objective, Pakistan stated preferences among 
objectives, Pakistan generated possible alternative courses of action, Pakistan 
assessed the consequences of every alternative action of each objective and 
Pakistan as a rational actor selected the best alternative (or was it the best?) 
Now, if we analyze further whether the first two options of "doing nothing" 
and "turning to International community" were really considered, then the time 
span in which the decision was made and the third option "to respond in kind" 
was finalized, leaves us in ambiguity. Despite the merits and demerits for the first 
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two options, it is my assumption that they were not thoroughly analyzed by the 
Pakistani officials. Reason being that any decision in history ever taken by 
Pakistan at the national and international level has been India-centered. Pakistan 
has felt insecure since the time of Independence in 1947 and therefore has 
always paid heavy prices and high costs for her decisions to go to war with India 
over a period of 55 years. After Indian detonation, this state of insecurity was 
further heightened. 
For the purpose of analysis, following are the statements that were given 
by Pakistani officials between May 11th and May 31st which help explain the 
mood since the time of Indian explosions till the time Pakistan detonated and 
might help explain how difficult it was to select an alternative action which would 
maximize the gains and minimize the costs. 
Khan stated on May 11, 1998 following India's announcement that it had 
conducted nuclear tests stated that 
"Pakistan strongly condemns this Indian act and the entire world should 
condemn it. It has sucked Pakistan into an arms race. 1132 
The purpose of this statement was to let the International community know 
indirectly that if Pakistan responds in kind then it would not be because Pakistan 
wants so but because India has started an arms race in the region which is 
unilateral in every aspect. 
A statement issued by the Pakistani Defense Committee on May 13, 1998 
stated that 
"The Indian government had in recent weeks exhibited a pattern of 
irresponsible behavior and taken deliberate steps to further heighten the tensions 
in the region. 1133 
32Pakistani Foreign Minister, Gohar Ayub Khan, The News International, May 12, 1998;pg.l 
33 Report by Pakistan Defense Committee, The Daily Jang Newspaper, May 14, 1998;pg.1 
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Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on May 19, 1998 stated that 
"I think we want to show to the world that Pakistan is a responsible country 
... It can exercise restraint on itself. If India is doing this out of sheer madness ... 
we don't want to blindly follow suit. "34 
This above statement by Nawaz Sharif indicated his backing off from an 
earlier statement stating that a nuclear test by Pakistan was imminent. Later on a 
statement was given by Pakistani Foreign Secretary declaring that Pakistan had 
conducted a sixth nuclear test on May 30, 1998 
"Today we proved our credibility; there are no doubts anymore."35 
The above mentioned statements by Pakistan's Prime Minister, Nawaz 
Sharif and the Pakistani Foreign Ministry make a very good case to explain as to 
how Pakistani officials kept oscillating back and forth on the issue of Indian 
nuclear tests and Pakistan's unpredictable stand on the issue. After analyzing 
these statements from both the sides it is obvious that it was a very confusing 
situation for Pakistan especially when India had made it clear that her nuclear 
program was not Pakistan centered. Pakistani statements reflect the state of 
heightened insecurity at that time. At first Pakistan condemned and deplored 
India for her nuclear tests and blamed India for dragging her into the nuclear 
arms race. Later on the statements followed that Pakistan will avoid following the 
route India had taken and will not respond in kind. Finally, the statement from 
Pakistani Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad on May 30 confirmed that 
34 Report on televised address of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on May 19, 1998, The Daily Jang 
Newspaper, May 20, 1998; pg.I. (Report on televised address of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on May 19, 
1998) 
35 Shamshad Ahmad, The News International, May 31, 1998;p.l (Foreign Ministry Press briefing after the 
tests) 
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Pakistan had conducted six successful nuclear tests and has matched Indian 
nuclear capability. 
The analysis of these statements by Pakistani officials suggests that only 
one thing was guiding the light and that was to safeguard her "national security". 
This national security card has been and is always played between India and 
Pakistan and it was no different in 1998 as well. Thus, we can state that this 
model does not provide us with sufficient explanation as to why Pakistan 
exploded its nuclear devices in 1998 rather than opting for alternatives which 
would have reduced the costs and benefited her in the long run. I say that 
because firstly, Pakistan (as a rational actor) did not make an exhaustive search 
for alternatives. One reference to support my claim comes from a statement 
made by Deputy Chief of Mission; Embassy of Pakistan in the United States 
stating that Pakistan was already under sanctions from the International 
community and taking the nuclear route would not make any difference to the 
economic situation in Pakistan.36 This pre set mentality can also be seen in the 
earlier quoted remarks from the Foreign Minister of Pakistan as well as from the 
former Prime Minister Bhutto. Therefore, on the basis of analyzing this hawkish 
behavior coming from those in position of authority to influence the governmental 
decision suggests that may be the alternatives existed, the knowledge of their 
consequences existed but their taking into account and completely analyzing 
them was overshadowed by the preconceived frame of mind. Secondly, Pakistan 
ignored information that was inconsistent with her pre-existing beliefs which 
includes India's claim that India's nuclear program was and has never been 
36 http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june98/pakistan_5-26a.html 
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Pakistan centered. Despite these statements, Pakistan due to the inherent 
insecurity was bound to believe that India's detonations were the base of India's 
grand hegemonic design. Third, Pakistan's preference order was not fixed across 
time and space, meaning that the choice made to detonate was random and 
momentous with no long term implications in mind and was made under sheer 
internal pressures which include domestic egoist demands to come to par with 
India. 
Finally, even in we accept for a second that Pakistan made a rational 
decision, it does not follow that group decision making proceeds in a rational 
manner because in order to understand Pakistan's decision making the unitary 
actor model does not suffice as there is an interplay of so many factors which 
work in the background thus shaping the rationality or irrationality of her decision 
which ones needs to understand before analyzing her as a unitary decision 
maker. Decision-making in Pakistan does not follow a "unitary" decision-making 
model. The General Head Quarter (GHQ) headed by the Chief of the Army Staff 
(COAS), possess the authority to either approve or disapprove any decision 
being made. All the political and foreign policy decisions have to be approved by 
the COAS in order to be implemented. In sum, there are serious limitations to the 
Rational Actor Model. After having said this, I would continue to test Allison's 
Model II, the Organizational Process Model to find explanation to strengthen the 
case for Pakistan's national decision making. 
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CHAPTER Ill 
MODEL II: ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS MODEL 
In order to apply the Organizational Process Model, it is important to have an 
understanding of the process. Allison sees governmental behavior as to be 
understood not as deliberate choices of individuals but rather as "outputs of large 
organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior."37 Allison 
draws upon the organizational theory to build a model of governmental behavior 
based on multiple actors operating under constraints of bounded rationality and 
curtailed information. According to Allison there are five characteristic deviations 
from comprehensive rationality which are 
"1) Factored problems (problems are factored into different parts which 
are dealt with non- simultaneously) 
2) Satisficing (decision makers satisfice rather than optimize 
3) Search (organizations search using standard processes which limit 
choices) 
4) Uncertainty Avoidance (organizations deal with uncertainty by making 
decisions, then making small corrections, like a thermostat, rather than 
considering alternatives and making a single binding decision) 
5) Repertoires (of programs are developed that limit effective choice)."38 
Allison elaborates these five factors to strengthen his proposition of 
organizational process paradigm. Complex problems are broken down into 
pieces and then organizations factor them into parts which are to be dealt with 
different organizations and not one as a whole. Contrary to Rational Actor Model 
where the rational actor maximizes and optimizes his choice, in organizational 
process that maximizing is replaced by satisficing which means that the option 
37 Allison;pg.67 
38 March James and Simon Herbert, Organizations, New York, 1958. Here Allison builds on March and 
Simon's comprehensive rationality to derive five characteristic deviations as quoted; see pg. 71; 
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with the best possible consequence is chosen and all the rest of the options are 
not so carefully weighed thus limiting the alternatives. Allison also provides four 
concepts which link together goals, expectations and choice as follows 
"1) Quasi-resolution of conflict (or how conflicting goals are managed by 
achieving them sequentially) 
2) Uncertainty avoidance (or how organizations focus on short-term 
pressing problems and negotiate with the environment) 
3) Problematic search (or how firms search for solutions to problems 
based on simple minded rules) 
4) Organizational learning (or how goals, attention rules, and search 
procedures are altered)."39 
Allison's second model II has many decision makers with the same goals, 
but who are imperfectly rational and who have incomplete information; however, 
sometimes, he seems to imply that some of the decision makers have different 
goals. According to Allison, governments consist of large organizations among 
which primary responsibility for particular areas is divided. As understood, the 
actor is not a massive nation or government but rather an assemblage of "loosely 
allied organizations on top of which government leaders sit"40• Government 
behavior relevant to any important problem reflects the independent output of 
several organizations, partially coordinated by government leaders. Each 
organization has a fixed set of standard operating procedures. The behavior of 
these organizations and consequently that of the government in a particular 
instance is thus determined primarily by routines established prior to that 
instance. The leaders can exercise some choice in combining outputs, but the 
mass of behavior is determined by previously established procedures. 
39 Allison combines this with Cyert and March's process-oriented model of organizational choice; pg. 76 
40 lbid;80 
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Allison states that the organizations have parochial priorities, perceptions and 
interests due to several factors: 
"1. primary responsibility to a narrow set of problems 
2. availability of selective information 
3. tenure of individuals on the organization 
4. small group pressures within the organization and 
5. distribution of rewards by the organization"41 
In summing up the organizational process model, the basic unit of analysis 
is policy seen as organizational output and instead of one rational unitary actor, 
the fundamental units are organizations. The actions taken by the organizations 
are determined by routines, standard operating procedures (SOP's), repertoires 
and the organizations react to standard threats using the standard options 
available. The only way Allison's Organizational Process Model differs from the 
Rational Actor Model is through its claim that SOP's guide decision making rather 
than individuals finding alternatives to maximize their choices and making 
rational decisions. 
Organizational Process Model and Pakistan's detonation: 
If we analyze Pakistan's decision to detonate in the light of Organizational 
Process model then we need to investigate how the standard operating 
procedures laid the ground work for Pakistan's detonation of nuclear weapons. 
Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Capability: 
Pakistan's ability to deploy nuclear weapons had been clear since Nawaz 
Sharif openly stated in August 1994, "I confirm that Pakistan possesses the 
41 lbid;81 
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atomic bomb."42Later on a more official statement came from Prime Minister 
Benazir Bhutto stating in April 1995, 
"We have enough knowledge and capability to make and assemble a 
nuclear weapon. But we have voluntarily chosen not to either assemble a nuclear 
weapon, to detonate a nuclear weapon or to export technology."43 
There is a history of continuing arms race between India and Pakistan, but 
the real threat came from the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
which during the election campaign in India made a statement to the effect that 
BJP's "national agenda" would include adding nuclear weapons in India's 
arsenal.44 On April 02, 1998 after the statement by Bhartia Janta Party, Prime 
Minister Nawaz Sharif sent a letter to heads of State/Government of USA, UK, 
France, Russia, China, Japan, Italy, Belgium, Spain and Germany blaming India 
for her nuclear ambitions which were destabilizing for South Asia. The Prime 
Minister urged the international community to help curb the hostile Indian 
tendencies and promote nuclear nonproliferation in the region.45 Followed by this 
statement; on April 06, 1998 Pakistan successfully conducted an intermediate 
range missile test, Ghauri with a maximum range of 1,500 kilometers.46 This 
missile was a potential threat to Indian national security because it had a range 
of 930 miles, capable of hitting major Indian cities.47 This test was condemned by 
the Indian government and sent out clear signals that now Pakistan possesses 
42 Barber B., "Ex-Premier Declares Pakistan has A-Bomb", Washington Times, August 24, 1994. 
43 "Clinton pledges to settle dispute with Pakistan", Xinhua, April 12, 1995, in FBIS-CHI, September 27, 
1996. 
44 Foreign Media Reaction, Daily Digest, United States Information Agency, Office of Research and Media 
Reaction. April 10, 1998. 
45 http://www.fas.org/news/pakistan/1998/04/980402-pak-let.htm 
46 Akhtar Hassan, "Pakistan test-fires Ghauri missile," Dawn, 7 April 1998. 
47 Quoted in Christopher Allan McHorney, "India and Pakistan: Newest Members of the Nuclear Club", 
in Ralph Carter ed. (2002): CONTEMPORARY CASES IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (Washington, DC: CQ 
Press) 
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the capability to deliver her nuclear bombs through this missile. This missile test 
by Pakistan was responded by nuclear explosions on May 11 and May 13 by 
India which confirmed their statements about providing India with strong 
defenses. After the Indian nuclear tests Pakistan's nuclear scientist Dr. Abdul 
Qadeer Khan gave a statement on May 12 that 
"Pakistan has nothing to worry about Indian nuclear tests and is very well 
placed to meet threats to its security. We are ever ready and will do what the 
Government decides."48 
This statement by Pakistani nuclear scientist clearly reflects the 
confidence in Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability which was in a ready stage 
of deployment within a short span of time and the time limit. Pakistan exploded 
the nuclear devices between May 13 and May 28, which reiterates the claims 
that Pakistan possessed the nuclear weapons system as well as the system 
ready for early deployment. Looking at it from a sequential point of view based on 
an organizational process model, it can be stated that the standard operating 
procedures were put into place to test the nuclear capability and this came at a 
time when Pakistan had already tested the long range missile which could carry 
a nuclear warhead. 
Another fact that further strengthens Pakistan's designs to keep her 
nuclear machinery running and ready for use comes from a report published by 
David Albright, which stated that since the 1980s Pakistan had been working on 
a heavy water "research" reactor at Khushab. This reactor was alleged to be 
"indigenous", but was developed with technical assistance from China which also 
supplied the heavy water and was not subject to International Atomic Energy 
48 Qadeer Khan in an interview with Associated Press of Pakistan, May 12, 1998. 
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Agency (IAEA) inspections. Khushab had a capacity variously reported at 
between 40 MWT to 50 MWT (but as high as 70 MWT). It was "commissioned" in 
March 1996, but began operating only in April 1998.49 It is important to remember 
here that April 1998 was also the same month when Pakistan tested the Ghauri 
missile. Therefore, the debate about Pakistan's national security being 
threatened by Indian nuclear tests of May 11 & 13 and her subsequent claims 
about insecurities that arose as a result of Indian testing, has lesser weight 
keeping in mind the calm expressed by Dr. Khan in his statement about 
Pakistan's response. This scenario is only plausible when one analyzes it from 
the organizational process model which emphasizes that the standard operating 
procedures pave the way for decision making. 
Pakistan's nuclear explosions: Detonation details: 
Understanding Pakistan's nuclear capability is important to understand its 
final decision to detonate. It is also important from an organizational perspective 
because it requires organizational competency to undertake such a tremendous 
task involving high levels of coordination. Pakistan had acquired the ability to test 
a nuclear device as early as 1984. Following India's abortive bid in 1995 to test 
its nuclear devices, Pakistan had prepared a nuclear test site in the Chagai 
district of Southwestern Baluchistan, bordering Iran and Afghanistan. According 
to Pakistani Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan's "aim was to tell the 
49 David Albright. 1998. ISIS Technical Assessment: Pakistan's Efforts to Obtain Unsafeguarded Plutonium 
are Nearing Fruition, Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), June 1, 1998. 
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Indians that their move will be matched" and to send the West "a clear signal that 
they had better done something to stop the lndians."50 
In May 1998, all that Pakistani nuclear scientific state required was the 
necessary political approval which was withheld until Pakistani decision makers 
were sure that retaliatory tests would not incur unacceptable diplomatic and 
economic costs. The order to conduct the tests was given on 18 May, 1998 
because an exclusive Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) meeting was 
held on 16 or 17 May, 1998 and was attended only by the Prime Minister, the 
Foreign Minister (Gohar Ayub Khan), the Finance Minister (Sartaj Aziz) and the 
three Armed Services Chiefs. This meeting has never been officially 
acknowledged but it must have been held as neither the Prime Minister nor the 
Chief of the Army Staff alone could have made the decision to conduct the 
nuclear tests. The DCC was the only competent authority to decide on this 
matter, especially since the National Command Authority (NCA), Pakistan's 
nuclear command and control authority for its strategic forces, did not exist at 
that time. 51 
From an organizational perspective, the decision remained as to which 
agency was competent enough to carry out the task of conducting nuclear tests. 
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission was said to be the pioneer in setting up the 
Chagai nuclear test site and was capable of conducting cold testing. Therefore, 
on 18 May 1998, the Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission 
(PAEC) was summoned to the Prime Minister House where he was relayed the 
50 Quoted in Zahid Hussain's, "Laying the Groundwork", News line, June 1998;pg.24 
51Rai Muhammad Saleh Azam. 2000. When the Mountains Move - The Story of Chagai, Defence Journal, 
June 2000 
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decision of the DCC. "Dhamaka kar dein" (Conduct the explosion") were the 
exact words used by the Prime Minister to inform him of the Government's 
decision to conduct the nuclear tests.52 The PAEC Chairman went back to his 
office and gave orders to his staff to prepare for the tests. Simultaneously, 
General Head Quarters (GHQ) and Air Headquarters issued orders to the 
relevant quarters in 12 Corps, Quetta, the National Logistics Cell (NLC), the 
Army Aviation Corps and No. 6 (Air Transport Support) Squadron respectively to 
extend the necessary support to the PAEC in this regard. The Civil Aviation 
Authority (CAA) also directed the national airline, Pakistan International Airline 
(PIA), to make available a Boeing 737 passenger aircraft at short notice for the 
ferrying of PAEC officials, scientists, engineers and technicians to Baluchistan.53 
After analyzing this account it becomes clear that from the time the order 
to conduct the explosion was given on May 18 until the time it actually took place 
on May 28, there was a gap of only 10 days. In these 10 days the test site was 
prepared, weapons were delivered to the site and necessary preparations were 
made to conduct the nuclear testing. This suggests that Pakistan had the ability 
to deliver nuclear arsenals all along, had the place to conduct it on a short notice 
and finally found the motive to accomplish what it had been trying to do in past 
years. The Indian nuclear tests gave Pakistan just the right timing and excuse to 
conduct her nuclear capability. Without this excuse Pakistan would never had 
been able to declare herself a nuclear weapons state. Therefore, in response to 
52 http://www.piads.com.pk/users/piads/nuclear new .html 
53 http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/june/chagai.htm 
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Indian tests, Pakistan exploded five devices on May 28. A sixth device was 
detonated on May 30 which was conducted some 100 kms southwest of 
Baluchistan, according to seismic analysis. Like their Indian counterparts, 
Pakistani officials seem to have exaggerated the numbers and size of the 
explosions, announcing their first day's yield as 40-45 kilotons and a yield of 15-
18 kilotons for the test on May 30. Analysis of the seismic data does not support 
these claims. The average magnitude reported was 4.9 on May 28th and a 
magnitude of 4.3 on May 30.54 According to Dr.Khan, Pakistan's explosion of 
boosted fission devices used uranium 235 although it was capable of testing a 
thermonuclear device as well. He further stated that the first enrichment was 
done on April 4, 1978 and the plant was made operational in 1979 or so. By 1981 
Pakistan was producing substantial quantities of uranium.55 The enrichment of 
Pakistan's own uranium production allowed Pakistan the confidence to go ahead 
with any decision involving nuclear detonation without being hesitant of the 
competency to carry it out. 
Conclusion: 
From Organizational Process Model's point of view, I believe that the 
organizational options were narrowed down to whether Pakistan had the ability to 
carry out a nuclear explosion or not. After the Prime Minister received an 
assurance from the Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission that he could trust 
the proficiency of the technicians involved and technology at hand, it was only a 
matter of when and not if. If one wants to explain the specific characteristics of 
54 Terry C. Wallace, "The May 1998 India and Pakistan Nuclear Tests," Seismological Research letters, 
September 1998. 
55 Qadeer Khan, The News International, May 30, 1998;pg.1 
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governmental action then I believe that Model II is sufficient for that explanation. 
As proposed by Allison, the existing organizational routine limits the options, 
which is held true in this case because as analyzed earlier by Model I, Pakistan 
had three options before making the decision to detonate i.e. to exercise 
restraint, turn to international community for help or to respond in kind. These 
options boiled down to simply a question of whether the capability to conduct the 
tests existed or not. If yes, then how soon and if not, then what? 
Organizations are fundamental units according to Model II; therefore in 
this case, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), Kahuta Research 
Laboratories (KRL), the General Head Quarters (GHQ), the Air Headquarters, 
Civil Aviation Authority at the ground level, the Foreign Ministry and Pakistan's 
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISi) at the policy level, were the main units that 
played a crucial role in shaping the governmental decision. All of these 
organizations in their unique capacity assured their support and reflected 
positively on their capability to carryout the task at hand, which I believe made 
the governmental choice much easier. Model II also emphasizes that 
Organizations, by their nature, are parochial and tend to develop set propensities 
regarding priorities, perceptions, and issues.56 This also holds true at this level of 
analysis because after India conducted its nuclear tests then it became a matter 
of "ego" for the organizations in Pakistan which claimed over the years to have 
possessed the nuclear capability and for them to give shape to their claim was 
then or never. Their priorities were set by their abilities to match Indian claims at 
the same echelon in an equal response. This over-confidence on part of these 
56 Allison;81 
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organizations failed to account for any economic turmoil that was in sight if 
Pakistan had chosen the nuclear path and also ignored the possible economic 
and political restraints promised by the international community in wake of any 
nuclear explosions. The only concern of PAEC and KRL was to have a green 
signal from the government to carry on with the testing. 
The standard operating procedures were set in place and followed as the 
government of Pakistan processed a go ahead signal to PAEC. If PAEC did not 
have the capability to conduct nuclear testing then one could have stated that the 
SOP's were not the guiding light for decision making that was made on May 28, 
1998. But the evidence presented above suggests otherwise. The contribution of 
organizational intelligence is also a strong point in assessing the credibility of 
Model II. After the Indian tests, Pakistan was reportedly said to be receiving 
information of a possible attack by India and this is also regarded to be one of the 
reasons as to why Pakistan hurried into a decision to conduct her own nuclear 
explosions. 
The evidence of organizational intelligence comes from the summoning of 
Indian high commissioner, Satish Chandra at 1 :00 a.m EST on May 27 by 
Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Ahmed and reiterated that Pakistan possessed 
credible information of a planned Indian attack on Pakistan's nuclear 
installations, which was refuted by the Indian high commissioner.57 On the basis 
of this one can state that Model II has some logical implications and keeping in 
mind the influential nature of SOP's, it can be stated that organizations can guide 
57 News report on May 28, 1998; Rediff; http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/may/28bomb3.htm 
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the decision making process through following their set standard operating 
procedures. 
So far the explanation provided by Model II when applied in case of 
Pakistan's detonation holds some logic but some aspects still remain ambiguous. 
If one accepts the argument about Pakistan, testing its Ghauri missile in April 
followed by inflammatory statements by Dr. Qadeer regarding its capability and 
range as analyzed earlier then all seems to fall into sequence. Pakistan was to 
test this missile in March but the testing was postponed.58 The coming into power 
of BJP government was considered as a threat to Pakistan's national security 
because it maintained a very strong moratorium on including nukes to India's 
arsenals for defense purposes without even conducting any tests. Pakistan used 
the statement by a senior Indian policy official as a base for stating that Indian 
nuclear ambitions should be curbed and that a nuclear India would be a threat to 
the regional stability.59 1 believe that perhaps that was the time when Pakistan 
started to plan for a response in case the BJP government kept its words and 
carried on with the nuclear explosions. After BJP's coming into power, there was 
created much hype about Nuclear India which was one of the strongest points 
during BJP's election campaign bringing it home electoral victory.60 This in itself 
provides sufficient explanation for Pakistan if any such action took place in the 
wake of the moment. 
58 News report on April 06, 1998; Rediff; http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/apr/06pakbom.htm 
59 Ali Zaidi; Voice of America, April 25, 1998; http://www.fas.org/news/pakistan/1998/04/980425-pak.htm 
60BJP Election Manifesto: http://www.bjp.org/manifes/chap8.htm 
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The sequence in which the events line up from the time of BJP 
government coming into power, Pakistan's postponement of testing its ballistic 
missile and later on resuming the testing, India responding to the ballistic missile 
threat by conducting nuclear weapons and Pakistan responding in kind, it seems 
as if the organizational planning and implementation played a very important role. 
A thorough analysis of Model 11 leads me to suggest that perhaps an earlier 
planning process allowed the nuclear option to be exercised. The standard 
operating procedures had to be set in place before a decision could be taken 
which further strengthens the fact that a quicker response to Indian nuclear tests 
was absent. 
It would not be wise to rule out any possibility that Pakistan triggered this 
whole arms race at that point in time when BJP was in power and Pakistan knew 
that it was in a critical position to respond to any Pakistani aggression. Pakistan 
also knew that nuclear policy was at the core of BJP government's policies and 
there could have been no way they would have restrained from testing the 
capability which would bring their government long-term stability. Considering 
this scenario one can state that perhaps the standard operating procedures were 
laid down to achieve that one objective for which Pakistan needed a viable 
justification. One thing that relates to the ambiguity of the whole organizational 
process approach is the internal politics of the organizations that were at play in 
Pakistan in 1998. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is on record to state (as analyzed 
earlier in Chapter II) that Pakistan would refrain from testing. He issued this 
statement in a televised nation-wide address soon after he condemned Indian 
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tests and maintained that Pakistan would not follow the same insanity which was 
the driving force for India. Later on he issued a congratulatory statement that 
Pakistan successfully conducted five nuclear tests in response to Indian 
explosions and have settled the score. Model II fails to predict this behavior 
because according to Allison as mentioned earlier, the leader of the government 
sits on top of the loosely allied organizations. If we accept this to be true, then it 
directs us to believe that there was much more internal politics amongst the 
organizations at the ground level, which did not let the leader, have his way. 
Given more time, Nawaz Sharif (who was reluctant to begin with) would have had 
his resolve of choosing the non-nuclear option but before his words could be 
carried out, the organizational machinery paved a way treading on which became 
inevitable for him. 
In order to understand the politics at play amongst the organizations, 
which may or may not have been the cause of directing the decision-making, 
Allison's Model Ill provides another explanation, which I will analyze in the 
subsequent chapter. Therefore, as far as the Organizational Process Model's 
explanation of standard operating procedures steering the decision making is 
concerned, I believe that Model II does possess some relevance, but as far as 
the intricate details of decision making is concerned regarding how much 
influence was placed by the organizations to help close the deal, one will need to 
find the answers through analyzing Allison's Model Ill, the Bureaucratic Politics 
Model (without which the central question of the thesis will still remain 
unanswered). 
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CHAPTER IV 
MODEL Ill: BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS MODEL 
The last model to explain the national decision-making by Allison finds its basis in 
bureaucratic politics. The governmental politics model conceives of governmental 
policy-making not as a rational actor choice or organizational output but resultant 
of bargaining along regular circuits among players positioned hierarchically within 
the government. According to Allison, the government's decisions are resultants 
because 
"what happens is not chosen as a solution to a problem but rather results 
from compromise, conflict and confusion of officials with diverse influence and 
unequal influence."61 
In this model, the political actors and their intentions, positions and 
interests, their relative power, the action channels through which the political 
actors input and exert their influence, decision rules and similar matters stand to 
the fore in analysis. Allison has arranged the organizing concepts of this model 
by explaining the players in position with their parochial priorities and 
perceptions. He states that 
"The governmental actor is neither a unitary actor nor a conglomerate of 
organizations, but rather is a number of individual players."62 
These individuals are players in the game of national security policy and 
their actions and preferences stem from the position they occupy. Allison 
identifies these players as 
"Chiefs (heads of different organizations), staffers (immediate staff of each 
chief), Indians (permanent government officials in each organization) and ad hoc 
61 Allison;l62 
62 lbid;l64 
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players (oress, interest groups spokespersons and public from concentric 
circles)."l>3 
One interesting detail that follows after identifying their positions is their 
way of dealing with the issue in question considering their priorities and interests. 
Allison states that 
"answers to the question ''what is the issue?" are colored by the position 
from which the question is considered."64 
This explains as to why there never is unanimity in decisions because 
every position held in the organization contributes to a different point of view, 
unlike the assumptions of Allison's Model I according to which the action taken 
by the unitary actor is intentional. Allison however, lays much emphasis on the 
Indians (as specified earlier) who are responsible for framing, finding alternatives 
and finally pushing the proposal to the Chiefs. According to Allison any issue in 
policy making has three sides to it which can be defined in the context of Indians' 
point of view: 
"the issue looking down is options; the issue lookin~ sideways is 
commitment and the issue looking upward is confidence." 5 
The issue defined as options is considered to be a way of preserving the 
Indians' own room for maneuver until things become clearer. Commitment is the 
sideway issue which includes how others can be convinced to join Indians' own 
beliefs. Finally the confidence Allison talks about is the issue of looking upward 
entailing that the Indians give confidence to the chief to do what must be done. 
Allison explains this point further by clarifying Neustadt's declaration that 
63 Ibid;165 
64 Ibid;l66 
65 Ibid;177 
55 
"the essence of any responsible official's task is to persuade other players 
that his version of what needs to be done is what their own appraisal of their own 
responsibilities requires them to do in their own interests."66 
I believe this to be a very important point in explaining as to how the 
Indians succeed in influencing the Chiefs and shaping their decisions by merely 
giving them confidence in doing something that already is in accordance with 
their duties and responsibilities. Thus, in order to sum up Model Ill, I will use the 
aphorism used by Allison "where you stand depends on where you sit."67 In 
contrast to the notion that there exists some single national interest, there is an 
array of organizations and therefore there are bureaucratic interests overriding 
the one national interest. Each bureau argues that its interests align with the 
national interest, but in reality there are many separate interests. This politics is 
what constitutes Allison's bureaucratic politics model, which provides explanation 
for a national decision resulting as a competition between the interests pursued 
by these different bureaus. According to conclusions drawn by Allison, Model II 
illuminates the organizational routines that produce the information, alternatives 
and action and it is within the context that Model Ill emerges. As Allison states: 
"Model Ill focuses in greater detail on the individual leaders of a 
government and politics among them that determine major governmental 
choices."68 
Since, Model II and Model Ill draw great resemblances from each other 
and Model Ill bases its further ground of explanation (of a governmental choice of 
action) derived from the postulates of Model II; I would apply Model Ill as follows. 
66 Ibid. Allison quotes from Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power, New York. 1960; Chapter 3. 
67 lbid;176 
68 lbid;258 
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Model 111 when applied will explain which players in what positions were centrally 
involved and what were the existing channels of action available to them. 
Bureaucratic Politics Model and Pakistan's detonation: 
In order to apply Model Ill for explaining Pakistan's detonation in 1998, it is 
important to recognize that the governmental action is a political resultant, which 
according to this Model forms the basic unit of analysis. Therefore, to analyze 
Model Ill and the organizing concepts as proposed by Allison, I will answer the 
same set of questions as Allison asked, but in the context of Pakistan's decision 
to go nuclear. Allison posed four interrelated questions: 
"Who plays? What determines each player's stand? What determines 
each player's relative influence? How does the game combine player's stand, 
influence and moves to yield governmental decisions and actions?"69 
Chiefs, staffers, Indians and ad hoc players 
The dramas lengthy cast of characters were players in the national 
security policy game by virtue of their position. They were the civilians in the 
Parliamentary administration of Nawaz Sharif and the military players in the 
General Head Quarters (GHQ). In order to identify the players whose interests 
and actions effect the governmental decision, I will break them down into players 
in position as explained earlier i.e. Chiefs, staffers, Indians and ad hoc players. 
The Chiefs would include the president, prime minister, parliamentarians, foreign 
minister, cabinet members, Chiefs of the Armed Forces, COAS as head of the 
General Head Quarters (GHQ), Head of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission 
(PAEC), Head of Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL), Chief of Civil Aviation 
Authority (CIA), Governors and Chief of Inter Services Intelligence (ISi). 
69 Ibid;l64 
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The Indian nuclear tests created a situation in which the Pakistani 
leadership saw both an even greater need to test and a possible opening to 
justify the test as a response that was both politically and strategically 
understandable. By 1998, the Pakistani military had grown very sensitive to the 
decline of its conventional military capabilities after US cooperation was stopped 
by the Pressler Amendment in 1990. Between 1990 and 1996, Pakistan became 
dependent on Chinese arms when some US military equipment that had been 
paid for in 1980s was released under "one-time waiver''. Every major arms 
supplier was involved in cooperation with India at that time.70 Pakistan's loss of 
its arms supplier (US) to India, led to a feeling of abandonment and resentment. 
Chair of national Assembly's Standing Committee for Defense Affairs stated that 
"The order in conventional arms has now been disturbed to a great extent."71 The 
feeling of abandonment reinvigorated the military's interest in nuclear deterrence 
of conventional war. 
On the political front, despite pressures from the military and the 
opportunity opened by the Indian tests, Nawaz was apparently reluctant to 
authorize them. On May 19, 1998 a week after the Indian tests he stated that 
"Why we are not testing is because of the fact that I want to show the 
world that Pakistan is a responsible country. If India is doing it out of sheer 
madness, we do not have to blindly follow the suit."72 
70 U.S-India Defense ties became better in the mid 90's when Pakistan was still suffering from the Pressler 
amendment. This US shift towards India, left Pakistan dependent on Chinese reliance for arms. This 
reference explains the not so favorable US tilt toward India. In 1995, Bruce 0. Reidel, the deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, told Congress, "US-Indian defense ties are 
better now than at any time in the past 30 years". US House of Representatives, Committee on International 
Relations and US Interests in South Asia (US Government Printing Office: Washington 1997) p.96. 
71 Cheema, The News International, April 23, 1998;p.l 
72 Quoted in Sheikh, S, "Pakistan not to sit back iflndia attacks, declares Nawaz", The News International, 
May 20, 1998. 
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Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was hesitant to test and was genuinely 
concerned about the impact economic sanctions will have on Pakistan in the 
wake of any nuclear tests. Within his cabinet, differences of opinion existed. 
Some factions supported and some opposed nuclear testing, thus attempted to 
influence the public opinion through broadcast and print media.73 But those 
officials who opposed did not carry much weight as far as their position of 
influencing the decision making was concerned. But on the other hand, Pakistan 
military's thinking was influenced by factors such as prestige as well as 
perceptions of an Indian threat. Senior military personnel believed that, "We will 
never be able to remove the nuclear imbalance if we do not follow suit with our 
own explosion."74 Therefore, the internal balance tilted towards a retaliatory 
response resulting in May 1998 Pakistani nuclear detonation. In the perceptions 
of Pakistan's authoritative decision makers, US military and economic incentives 
did not measure favorably against issues of prestige and credibility. 
Under pressure from the military, Nawaz Sharif warned President Clinton 
that the decision "was out of my hands", implying that the military high command 
was ultimately responsible for Pakistan's nuclear response.75 Pakistan's Inter 
Services Intelligence (ISi) also remained a very active player and helped shaped 
the decision making especially where the nuclear explosions of 1998 were 
concerned. Pakistani intelligence gathered some sources stating that two 
American fighter jets were spotted at a Forward Operating Indian airbase on May 
73 Quoted in Zahid Hussain, "The Bomb and After", Newsline (June 1998), pg: 22-23. A pro-test official 
argued that Pakistan had "no other choice but to go for our own test", while another official opposing the 
testing argued that "a nuclear test would be a disaster for Pakistan". 
74 Quoted in Zahid Hassan, "Laying the Groundwork", Newsline (June 1998), p.24 
75 Quoted in Michael Hirsh and John Barry, "Nuclear Jitters", Newsweek, June 08, 1998, p.16 
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27. It was stated that they were there to take out Pakistan's nuclear installation 
backed by an Indian plan to sever the Pakistani response to its nuclear 
explosions of May 11 and 13, 1998.76 Therefore, on the basis of this intelligence 
reported, though later on denied by Indian officials, led Pakistani government to 
finalize the decision either for or against the nuclear detonation. The results of 
the Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) as discussed in analysis of Model 
II in previous chapter as well, indicated that it was only the Minister of Finance & 
Economic Affairs, Sartaj Aziz who opposed the tests keeping in mind the 
repercussions that Pakistan would have to face in the wake of imposition of 
heavy economic sanctions.77 
The meeting was attended by all the Chiefs as Allison has termed, which 
included the Prime Minister of Pakistan, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Gohar Ayub Khan, the Minister of Finance & Economic Affairs, 
Sartaj Aziz, the Foreign Secretary, Shamshad Ahmed Khan and the three Chiefs 
of Staff of the Army, Air Force and Navy, namely General Jehangir Karamat, Air 
Chief Marshal Pervaiz Mehdi Qureshi and Admiral Fasih Bokhari respectively.78 
All of them favored Pakistan carrying on with the nuclear explosions with the 
exception of Aziz. 
Allison defines staffers as the immediate staff of each Chief and Indians 
as the permanent political appointees which would be the civil service machinery 
in case of Pakistan, but where nuclear detonation decision is concerned, I have 
failed to find any reference whatsoever to support this claim that staffers and 
76 http://www.geocities.com/ikramulhaq_l 999/l 8.html 
77 http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew/Pakistan/PakTests.html 
78 http://www.piads.corn.pk/users/piads/nuclear_new.html 
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even Indians were players in position and had some influence on decision 
making. I would, however, include ad hoc players in my application of Model Ill 
which includes press and influential groups having substantial influence in 
strengthening the decision that was taken. Public opinion and the opinions 
collected by think tank organizations carried some weight in influencing the 
governmental decision. Former chairman of the Institute of Strategic Studies in 
Islamabad, said, "We have to come out and achieve a certified nuclear status. 
The price is going to be very, very heavy but we have to be prepared to pay 
that."79 
Domestic political pressures made it exceedingly difficult for Sharif to 
exercise the non-nuclear option. Emotion-charged demonstrators took to the 
streets in several cities to burn Indian flags and to demand that the government 
reply to India's nuclear tests with tests of its own. Opposition political leaders 
were demanding quick nuclear detonations. Among them was former Prime 
Minister Benazir Bhutto, who told a television interviewer in London that without 
such tests, "India will have an upper hand and will resort to aggression against 
Pakistan at its own sweet will."80 Beyond these political pressures lie cold 
strategic calculations. The Prime Minister decided to consult the leaders of 
national political parties on the situation arising out of the Indian nuclear tests. 
The purpose of such consultations was to elicit their opinion in order to achieve a 
national consensus on the policy Pakistan should adopt to deal with the 
79 Muratza Pooya, The News International, May 13, 1998 pg.2 
80 Quoted in Kinzer, Stephen, "Pakistan Under World Pressure to Refrain From Nuclear Tests," New York 
Times, May 15, 1998;pg.1 
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situation. 81 Therefore, these interest groups or think tank organizations helped 
raise the public sentiments toward a nuclear response from Pakistan and "reveal" 
that the domestic pressure molded the government's decision to not settle for 
anything else. This shows that the ad hoc players did hold a position in national 
decision making and thus in some characteristic influenced governmental action. 
Compromise, Coalition, Competition and Confusion 
Each player brought assorted parochial baggage to the table. Individual 
priorities, perceptions and problems contributed to the pulling and hauling 
between various government officials from which the whole scenario of 
responding to Indian nuclear tests in kind evolved. Accordingly, the decision 
taken by Pakistan to detonate was not a conscious policy decision by a unitary 
rational actor and as explained by Allison: 
"It was an outcome resulting from compromise, coalition, competition and 
confusion among government officials who see different faces of an issue."82 
A review of perceptions, interests and actions will help explicate Allison's 
models further. As explained earlier, the interest pursued by the military was far 
different and long term than that pursued by the political organizations or even 
the ad hoc players for that matter (the public and interest groups). The goals and 
interests that affect players' desired outcomes include national security interests, 
organizational interests, domestic interests and personal interests. 
Regarding the competition between the players, it was a difficult decision 
to reach as to whether the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) should 
carry out the nuclear testing or the Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL) and 
81 http://www.fas.org/news/pakistan/1998/05/980516-pbc.htm 
82 Allison; pp 70-71 
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finally on May 18, 1998 the task was assigned to PAEC. When news reached Dr. 
A.Q. Khan at KRL that PAEC will carry out the nuclear testing, he lodged a 
strong protest with the Chief of Army Staff, General Jehangir Karamat. The Army 
Chief, in turn, called the Prime Minister. Amongst the two, it was decided that 
KRL personnel would also be involved in the nuclear test preparations and 
present at the time of testing alongside those of the PAEC.83 What determines 
each player's impact on results is what Allison terms as "power". This power 
stems from the position held by the player, their expertise and control over 
information, power to identify options and estimate feasibilities which enables 
chiefs to implement decisions. 84 This aspect can be determined by the ability and 
assurances given by PAEC to the Prime Minister that the operation can be 
carried out as all the technological capabilities were in order. This gave 
confidence to the Chiefs (the Prime Minister and COAS) to go ahead and finalize 
the decision. 
Conclusion: 
After analyzing the basic concepts of Model Ill and implementing it, there 
still are many vacuums left which need to be filled. For these vacuums, Model Ill 
fails to predict the course. As far as the players are concerned, Model Ill provides 
a useful explanation about the actions emanating from the position held by the 
actors. In the case of Pakistan's detonation, there was a very strong position 
possessed by different players. The Foreign Minister was executing his power by 
issuing strong statements that came out right after India conducted its nuclear 
83 http://www.piads.eom.pk/users/piads/nuclear_new.html 
84 Allison;pp.168-169 
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tests accusing it of always having possessed a covert developing and testing of 
her nuclear program.85 This shows that the Foreign Ministry of Pakistan held a 
very strong hawkish position on the Indian nuclear tests. The bureaucratic 
machinery of Nawaz's government took a very firm stand in blaming the 
international community for not taking the warnings by the Pakistani government 
about Indian nuclear tests into serious consideration. Sharif and later the Foreign 
Minister assured the public that all measures would be taken to safeguard 
national security and that any response from Pakistan was backed by the 
military's capability to match it.86 
The role that Pakistan's Army played in Pakistan's politics has always 
remained distinguished and lndo-centric. All the defensive strategies are based 
on a threat from India which out-powers Pakistan by her conventional military 
strength. This was further aggravated when India tested her nuclear tests and 
called Pakistan's bluff of having nuclear weapons capability. Pakistan's defense 
policy is inseparable from its foreign policy to a larger extent, taking into 
consideration its lndo-centric defense policy. As a commentator has aptly 
remarked, 
"Military needs had to command foreign policy. And because foreign and 
defense policies are tor the new states a matter of survival they seriously affect 
domestic policy. By this chain of logic the leader of Pakistan army is propelled 
into the centre of decision-making and first its arbitrator and then its 
monopolist. "87 
85 Official statement from Pakistan following India's nuclear tests, May 12, 1998 
http://www.clw.org/coalition/pak05l1.htm 
86 "Sharif blames the West'', Hindu, May 13, 1998 
87 Wayne Wilcox, "Political Role of the Army in Pakistan: Some Reflections" in S.P. Verma and V. Narain 
eds., Pakistan Political System in Crisis: Emergence of Bangladesh, (Jaipur: University of Rajasthan Press, 
1972), p. 35. 
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After the lndo-Pak tension boiled over Kashmir in 1990, Pakistan 
accelerated its uranium enrichment program. The decision was taken by the 
President and Chief Of the Army Staff (COAS). This is admitted by Benazir 
herself during an interview to ABC television.88 This statement indicates the 
military nature of Pakistan's nuclear programme where the civilians hardly have 
any say. It is not surprising that some reports point out that no prime minister has 
ever been allowed to visit the nuclear facility in Kahuta.89 
Nawaz Sharif was aware of the reality after the embargo of US economic 
and military aid to Pakistan. The enrichment programme was capped, but he did 
not have any authority to roll back the nuclear programme to appease the 
Americans. He expressed his constraint in his interview to Barbara Crossette in 
June 1991, that although he wanted to take a flexible position, he could not since 
he was constrained by certain factors which pointed to the hard-liners in the 
military.90 All these indicate that the civilians have hardly any role in the matter of 
defense decision-making. This brief discussion on military's role in Pakistan 
suggests the civil-military relationship that forms the basis of bureaucratic politics 
and was at play in 1998 as well. This proves the basic and most important 
postulate of Model Ill, which states action as a political resultant. According to 
Allison 
"Each player pulls and hauls with the power at his discretion for outcomes 
that will advance his conception of national, organizational, group and personal 
interests. "91 
88 Quoted in Zahid Hussain, "The Bomb Controversy", News line, November 1991, p. 26. 
89 George Perkovich, "A Nuclear Third Way in South Asia", Foreign Policy, no. 91, Summer 1993, p. 90. 
90 Quoted in Barbara Crossette, "Pakistan Asks Talks on Atomic Spread", New York Times, June 7, 1991. 
91 Allison;171 
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In light of the above statement, one thing is clear; that both the military 
and the civilian establishments (leaving the Prime Minister aside) were willing to 
go ahead with the nuclear response to India's nuclear explosion. The 
commanding structure of the military explained above clarifies the authority it 
possesses where the foreign and defense policy issues are concerned. But, the 
conflicting statements from the Prime Minister as discussed previously, as well 
as in this chapter, remain a confusing issue. 
The Prime Minister heads the civilian establishment, heads the 
bureaucracy and also holds the title of Minister of Defense but still, what I fail to 
understand is his role as head of the state. I believe that the Foreign Ministry and 
the Military's hawkish tendencies played a game which only satisfied their own 
interests and there was no conflict among the civil-military at that point in time in 
1998. The lessons drawn from this aspect lead to the conclusion that both the 
civilian and the military establishments possessed one voice regarding the 
nuclear issue and when they pursued the same agenda there was no pulling and 
hauling amongst them. Thus this environment defies the postulate that 
bureaucratic politics exists. At least, in this case as I understand, the intra-
bureaucratic politics was almost non-existential because the three most 
important bureaus, the political government, the military and the PAEC were in 
complete agreement with each other to carry on the nuclear testing. As far as the 
intra-bureaucratic politics is concerned, no reference is found what so ever which 
would reveal that there was clash amongst individual players within the same 
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organization (with only Aziz taking a different stance which being the only 
example, becomes irrelevant). 
Therefore, after analyzing all the postulates, I believe that this Model does 
not provide enough explanation that "pulling and hauling" existed (from the 
evidence gathered. Sharif's claims to the international community being helpless 
by the domestic pressures and his statement to President Clinton about the 
situation being out of his hands, suggest that he had a limited degree of 
influence. But another way to analyze Sharif's statements could also suggest that 
perhaps these conflicting statements in the beginning were made for a face 
saving situation in front of the International community. He probably also could 
have used the stance of "helplessness" to appease President Clinton with whom 
he is on record for exchanging several intense phone conversations. 
Model Ill has proved useful in identifying the Chiefs and the views they 
held while being in a position of authority. It also helped to reveal certain 
pressures that were inflicted on Sharif. Therefore, after a complete analysis of 
Model Ill, it is safe to state that the governmental decision was a "political 
resultant" and not a single intentional "choice" made by Pakistan. 
I believe that there are many other factors that influence a governmental 
decision making besides the bureaucracy and politics it entails. Religion, geo-
political structure, technology, international actors, capital resources, GNP of a 
country and much more together determines a certain national decision making. 
Unless all that is taken into account, a complete rationalization of a decision 
cannot be provided. This is where Model Ill alone does not suffice the 
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explanation of national decision making and is a research limitation for Model Ill. 
Perhaps historians will later find some "Indians' and more information will be 
disclosed. We are also limited because of free access to bureaucratic 
deliberations that were undertaken at that time which, once accessed will surely 
unveil certain hidden facts. 
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CHAPTERV 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this thesis was to apply Graham Allison's national decision 
making model to answer why Pakistan opted to go nuclear in 1998. Past 
research indicates how difficult it is to apply Allison's models in their entirety. The 
literature review presented in this thesis reveals more criticisms of the models 
than it does the applicability. Various authors have criticized the models from the 
International Relations perspective as well as from the Public Administration's 
point of view. This thesis attempted to apply the models of Rational Actor, 
Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics from an international politics 
perspective. 
After applying the three models, I conclude that all three of them have 
some insights to offer in answering the main question of the thesis. The 
usefulness of Rational Actor Model (Model I) in applying it to the Pakistani case 
comes from it predicting the governmental action as a "choice" that maximized 
Pakistan's strategic goals. Model I also helped in envisaging Pakistan as a 
national actor which identified the problem and searched for alternatives to solve 
that problem. But for Model I, a serious limitation that my research suffered from 
was analyzing Pakistan's decision to detonate as a "unitary actor". There is no 
way that the rationality of this decision could be explained through gauging the 
unitary actor model because of the complexity of the events that led to the 
decision. Also the involvement of various internal and external actors, clouds our 
assumptions which are conflicting with the basic concepts of Model I. 
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The Organizational Process Model (Model II) however proved quite useful 
in its application in this particular case. Firstly, the organizational process model 
is very technical in its applicability. Since Pakistan's going nuclear involved 
technicalities which could only have been revealed through the powerful 
explanation Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) provide therefore, most of 
my queries were answered through a deeper analysis of Model II. During my 
research I unveiled certain sequences of events which otherwise would never 
have been revealed had I not used the "Organizational Process Model". A fruitful 
line of research is likely to be found in Model II which could be helpful in 
providing a whole different outlook to the question posed. After applying the 
Organizational Process Model, I find it interesting to suggest that Pakistan's 
testing of the Ghauri Missile in April 1998 was likely the result of BJP coming in 
power in March 1998. BJP has always maintained a strong nuclear posture 
which I believe was used by Pakistan to flex her own nuclear muscle. After 
testing Ghauri in April 98, it provided Pakistan with a delivery vehicle which could 
carry nuclear warhead with a range that could make India vulnerable. This 
scenario did not leave Indian government comfortable and pushed them to resort 
to a response which was no less than nuclear. This also helped them call 
Pakistan's bluff about possessing nuclear capability which Pakistan always 
maintained it had. 
Applying Model II helped me divulge that probably the Standard Operating 
Procedures were set into motion in the first place so to achieve the very same 
response which India provided Pakistan by detonating her nuclear devices on 
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May 11 & 13 in 1998. This in turn gave Pakistan an edge over India to play her 
"national security" card which has been used for so many instances in the past. 
Only this time it worked as a double edged sword which helped Pakistan show 
the rest of the world how insecure she was with India going nuclear. Although 
there is no solid reference to back up my statement here but I do strongly believe 
that the sequence in which the events fell as unfolded by the application of Model 
II, it bears a very good relevance to what might have initiated a decision. This 
lack of reference to support my claims leads me to the limitation of my research. 
The Bureaucratic Politics Model (Model 111) also provided some useful 
insights into the matter of Pakistan choosing to detonate. The basic concept of 
Model Ill successfully suggested that the governmental action was a political 
resultant rather than a choice (refuting the claims of Model I). It also helped 
clarify the players in position with their parochial priorities. But I believe that 
identification of the Chiefs of various different bureaus leaves us suspended 
where the pulling and hauling between the bureaus is concerned. Allison's Model 
Ill is beneficial in analysis only when there is a clear bureaucratic politics involved 
within the bureaus and outside the bureaus. In this case as research shows, the 
bureaucratic politics was missing and thus failed to reveal how much influence it 
actually had (or could have had) in shaping the decision taken by the Prime 
Minister. 
While conducting research on a foreign policy issue one is bound to fall 
into a vacuum where an absence of data exists. This is exactly what my research 
suffers from. There were many times during this research when I reached a dead 
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end while trying to answer some questions regarding the defensive posture of 
Pakistan or some closed door debates between the troika of the Prime Minister, 
the Chief of the Army Staff and the General Head Quarters (GHQ). The official 
documents were not revealed at the time Pakistan went nuclear and they are not 
available to a non-military source to date. This caused some serious problems 
because I am so certain that some official comments or documentaries of the 
official meetings that took place between May 13 and May 28 could reveal some 
undisclosed hidden agendas. 
There also exist some limitations to Allison's Models as well. During my 
research I found it very hard to resist taking into account roles that "external" 
agents play in shaping a policy issue. These external agents in Pakistan's case 
were the International actors which influenced Pakistan's decision to detonate. 
They include the United States with President Clinton being on the forefront, it 
includes the BJP government (and the whole geo-political environment that is 
inevitable for Pakistan not to take into account while making a foreign policy 
decision) and it also includes China as a country which aided Pakistan's nuclear 
program. Without their clandestine help Pakistan would never have been able to 
achieve the capability in the first place let alone test it. Clinton's position and 
influence is very important because had the Clinton administration provided 
Pakistan with more attractive economic deals than it did, perhaps the decision 
would have been different. BJP government after coming into power was 
responsible of coaxing the anti-Pakistani sentiments in their nation and kept a 
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very strong nuclear moratorium. Pakistan's decision to detonate was definitely 
suffering from all these international factors influencing in one way or the other. 
All these factors helped shape Pakistan's decision. Allison's three Models 
do not allocate for these International or geo-political concerns, which I believe 
are so important in analyzing any national or foreign policy decision making. I 
believe that all the three models tend to focus greatly on the internal actors or 
players that play a role in shaping any decision. 
One more limitation which I found with the applicability of Allison's Models 
is that perhaps it is a model to test decisions taken by only the Western styled 
democratic institutions. My reason for saying this is that in analyzing from a third 
world country's perspective, I maintain that it is very important to understand the 
psychology under which these nations operate in. Allison's three Models fall short 
in this argument because they are very rigid in their claim. They do not have any 
room for any psychological reasoning which sometimes drives nations to take up 
a certain course. And nations like Pakistan bring a huge psychological baggage 
with them before they make massive decisions like matching India's nuclear 
capability in kind. I trust that there still is much room left for further research but 
only if there is access to official documents, which might be revealed years from 
now. May be then we will finally find a more complete answer regarding why 
Pakistan chose to respond to Indian nuclear tests with nuclear explosions of her 
own when the alternatives to that decision if approached rationally could have 
provided a better future for the whole nation. 
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